Author: Leeson, Peter T.
Title: Pirational Choice: The Economics of Infamous Pirate Practices
Summary: This paper investigates the profit-maximizing strategies of violent criminal organizations by examining the economics of infamous pirate practices. The paper explores three practices pirates used to reduce tne costs and enhance the revenues of their criminal enterprise. First, the paper examines the priate flag, the Jolly Roger, which pirates used to signal their identity as unconstrained outlaws, enabling them to take prizes without costly conflict. Second, the article considers how pirates combine heinous torture, public displays of madness, and published advertisement of their fiendishness to establish a fearsome reputation and piratical brand name that prevented costly captive behaviors. Third, the article analyzes how pirates used artificial impressment to mitigate the increased risk of pirating in the 18th century as a result of English legal innovations. The unique context in which pirates sought profits, not a difference in pirate rationality, explains pirates' eccentric and often bizarre behavior. Pirates' infamous practices improved their efficiencey "on the account" enhancing their criminal enterprise's profitability.
Details: Fairfax, VA: Department of Economics, George Mason University, 2009(?). 40p.
Source: Internet Resource
Year: 2009
Country: International
URL:
Shelf Number: 113551
Keywords:
Criminal BehaviorCriminal EnterpriseEconomicsOrganized CrimePirates |
